Fact-finding delegation to Haiti, February 17–23

Findings and Recommendations

March 16, 2005

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I. Executive Summary

During its February 17–23 fact-finding visit to Haiti, the Haiti Democracy Project delegation found great reserve in Port-au-Prince about the performance of the transitional government. The technocratic transitional authority has not gained broad respect and receives wide criticism for failures of performance, for corruption, and for infiltration by anti-democratic elements including the former military. The transitional authority has an appropriate, nonpartisan stance towards possible candidates for election to a new, constitutional government. Despite criticism, the consensus is that the current authorities must remain in office as major changes before elections risk to result in a government with less legitimacy and competence. Structures of governance are very weak, with little authority in the countryside loyal to the center, and major weakness apparent in police, customs, the judiciary, and local government.

The former president has lost much support in the countryside, according to knowledgeable interlocutors, but retains the allegiance of some, including violent elements in greater Port-au-Prince. He is in regular contact with his supporters and clearly is politically active in Haiti from his residence in South Africa.

Lively debate centers on whether jobs or security are most urgent. Parsing the arguments leads the Haiti Democracy Project team to conclude that long-term investment, and the permanent employment it generates, demand much-improved security in terms of both competent policing and a favorable legal code and improved judiciary. More urgent is immediate employment-generating through expanded public works projects that put young men to work earning money and that address important deficiencies in urban sanitation and in inadequate roads around larger towns. Jobs can give young men a stake in the system and some hope that a genuine democratic process will provide for the future.

At the most basic level, security suffers from the twin perceptions about the inadequacy of the Haitian National Police and the passivity of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Consensus has it that the HNP is too small, under-equipped, and uneven in competence, and so infiltrated by either ex-military or sympathizers of the former president, as to preclude any real intelligence function. MINUSTAH, despite enhanced efforts since reaching full deployment in December 2004, is too passive, neither aggressive enough nor sufficiently nuanced in dealing with the combination of security threats it faces, notably including the most recent movement towards a tactical alliance between violent loyalists of the former president, the “chimères,” and elements of the former Haitian armed forces, “ex-FADH.”

The medium-term threat to Haiti centers on the activities of the transit drug traffickers. In the first instance they corrupt the police and the judiciary. They pose a broader threat to the nation through potential use of their product as payment and consequent increasing drug addiction. They promise to compromise Haiti’s future by providing the money for political candidacy with the consequence Haiti’s movement to become a narco-state. Of significant concern are the contacts between drug traffickers and the ex-military.

The matter of the former military touches every vital issue: governance in the countryside, security in the towns, and relations with the chimères and the drug traffickers.
Complicating the issue is that many in the civil society and in the government see the ex-military as the ultimate hedge against the return of the former president and his predatory, murderous administration. In addition, the ex-FADH have some genuine popular support, notably in rural areas where they are the authority.

Elections must take place this year and be “acceptable,” to Haitians. Mixed views exist on who may become candidates in the elections. Some argue that all Haitians, from Duvalierists to Aristide supporters, can be candidates; others seek to exclude supporters of the former president contending they can never be a loyal opposition. Civil-society groups support the notion of a Code of Conduct for Political Parties. A key party leader argued for political party groupings rather than inchoate politicking. Monitoring the election will likely be easier with polling stations reduced to six hundred or so from the twelve thousand of previous elections.

Broad consensus led by civil society argues for the utility of a voter registration card that will also be a national identity document. Establishing an individual’s civil status could be a great draw for the elections. Civil-society groups are planning a dynamic effort to focus interest on the elections, an effort in parallel, and, perhaps, in synergy with a government plan to generate a “national dialogue.”

Parties and their candidates will need cash to run for office. Consensus of both Haitian and international observers is that the electoral regulations must allow for foreign financing and, at the same time, ensuring that drug traffickers cannot buy seats in parliament.

II. Recommendations

A. To the government of Haiti

- Immediately begin to create jobs through a public-service effort with temporary employment
- Generate a project for the building of administrative centers in province capitals with the twin goal of local employment and reaffirmation that central government will benefit rural Haiti
- Begin a process to vet senior government advisers and staff at the presidency, the prime ministry, the key ministries, and police to identify ex-military, drug trafficker, and other penetrations
- Promulgate a set of transitional decrees that would bring national legislation on foreign and domestic investment in line with international norms to both begin a serious effort to induce foreign investment and to set the bar for the new, constitutional government
- Make the office of the Secretary of State for Public Security an effective element of the national police and security establishment
Make no further payments to ex-FADH except in return for disarmament.

**B. To the international community**

- Encourage and urge MINUSTAH to pursue its mandate more aggressively, particularly in support of the Haitian police in the line of fire. Be proactive in eliminating the hold of political gangs, ex-FADH, and drug dealers on sections of the population and national territory. Eliminate urban “no-go” zones.

- Determine the most effective way to add an air-mobile, quick-reaction force to the MINUSTAH mission. The mandate would particularly center on action outside of Port-au-Prince to bring about disarmament in the countryside and protect the electoral process. Canadian or French assets would be the first choice for such a force. The Haiti Democracy Project delegation does not all agree on possible U.S. participation in such a force.

- Reexamine the U.N. Civilian Police (CIVPOL) numbers and mandate to consider greater size and adding arrest powers.

- Expand and accelerate HNP training. U.S. police training, in parallel with the ongoing U.N. program, could concentrate on leadership training and intelligence gathering. The presence of Haitian-American trainers and auxiliaries would supply the best training and would provide an enormous boost in morale for those members of the HNP who are trying to build a new and professional police force.

- Enhance the police presence in the countryside by recruiting and dispatching a force of auxiliaries hired from Haitian-French, Haitian-Canadians and Haitian-American police and security professionals. Such a force should number up to a thousand. It could be part of the UN CIVPOL effort or created as a police brigade attached to the HNP. It would have arrest powers. The mandate would be to help ensure security through the elections and to stay until the HNP force reaches eight thousand.

- Organize a joint HNP-MINUSTAH operation to clear the ports of criminal elements and restore government control. Besides restoring revenue collection it would provide an opportunity for the HNP and MINUSTAH to demonstrate their ability to work together rather than at cross purposes.

- Implement a strictly-enforced MINUSTAH policy to arrest and disarm anyone in public carrying an unauthorized weapon. This should begin in the Port-au-Prince slum areas where violent crime is most intense.

- Ensure that the OAS voter registration effort has supplementary funding as needed and that the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) has the necessary money and international advisory contingent.
Supplement elections assistance with political-party financing to overcome threat of drug money buying elections.

Fund a program of qualified Haitian nongovernmental organizations to train a transition team to help prepare the entirely new elected government to take office in February 2006.

Explore feasibility of special U.N. tribunals with internationally-recognized francophone judges under MINUSTAH protection to try overdue cases such as that of former prime minister Yvon Neptune and other detainees that are beyond capacity of Haitian judicial system.

C. To the United States

Launch a series of high-level statements, visits, and policy actions to leave no doubt that the weight of the United States is there for elections. Visits of senior officials such as the undersecretary and deputy secretary of state to lead up to visit by secretary of state. (State Department and federal agencies).

Create a psychological sense of momentum and excitement towards:

1. More disarmament of the ex-military and gangs loyal to the former president. Make it public and splashy. The prime minister and U.N. special envoy should stand in front of a sizable pile of guns to be destroyed.

2. Cutoff of the drug flow to the United States and into Haitian politics

3. Convey how vital these elections are and where they could take Haiti. (White House and State)

Monitor supplementary funds for Haiti to ensure a focus on need for immediate job creation (State/Agency for International Development and Congress). Delegation considers this the most urgent immediate need because it is vital to draw young men from temptation of gangs and foster sense of hope and social inclusion. These immediate jobs in the area of public works.

Do a formal Threat Assessment in Haiti as part of reassessing the arms and training requirements of the HNP. Implement a fast track by the U.S. and Haitian governments for the purchase of appropriate armaments, helmets and protective gear for the HNP. Supply of materiel to police dependent on vetting noted above. (Department of Defense and State)

Deploy another three-month U.S. Navy Seabee training exercise to Gonaïves in the second half of 2005, during the elections, for flood-relief reconstruction. The current mission is having a positive humanitarian and security effect in this politically volatile
city because the simple sight of Americans in uniform in Haiti is reassuring to the population. (DoD)

- Dispatch a Drug Enforcement Administration in-country unit to work with the HNP to shut down the drug trafficking by sea on the southern coast and by land in well-identified airstrips. The unit should include a helicopter and an aircraft, and Haitian-American DEA agents should be seconded for this mission. It would serve the dual purposes of shutting down the trafficking to the United States and to Haitian criminals. (DEA)

- Warn of and carry out a cutback of U.S. aid to the interim government if it makes another payment to ex-FADH without disarmament.

- Pass legislation designed to energize the Haitian economy through trade incentives (H.E.R.O./HOPE; Congress).

- Hold hearings in May to assess and correct defects in approaches to voter registration and other electoral planning and in security actions (Congress).

III. Introduction

Haiti is approaching another opportunity to achieve, through elections, what it has lacked for most of the last half century: a legitimate, generally accepted political authority. Such a government could provide the framework for security, infrastructure and aid-absorption that could start Haiti’s climb out of horrific mass poverty. The recent awakening of civil society, the U.N. forces on the ground, and a $1.4-billion aid commitment all provide the elements for a favorable outcome.

But the demons of Haitian history—the small, violent minorities of armed power-seekers—are still front-and-center on the scene, infiltrating the shell of an interim government that was put in place after last year’s intervention by the U.S. marines, and challenging even the 8,500-person U.N. mission, MINUSTAH. Between them the political gangs professing loyalty to the former president and the ex-armymen partially control the slums and rural areas that make up the majority of the national territory. The two forces have begun to collude with the drug traffickers against the police and U.N. mission.

To see what additional inputs might assure the progress to elections, the Haiti Democracy Project sent a fact-finding mission to Haiti during February 17–23. The mission comprised three former U.S. ambassadors with deep experience in Haiti policy-making; prominent Haitian and Haitian-American businessmen; and experienced policy analysts. The mission followed up on an assessment mission the project sent in April 2004.

Our recommendations are aimed at assuring that Haiti consolidates its recent significant progress toward elections, which remain to our mind the key to finally resolving Haiti’s nineteen-year-old political crisis.
The present report relays our findings on the issues of governance, security and elections. A supplementary report in April will cover the economy and judiciary.

IV. Findings

This section is based on the interviews listed in the Appendix, Schedule of visits in Haiti, below. Emerging from the interviews is a snapshot of Haitian public opinion as of February 2005 as well as the views of the interim regime and its foreign supporters. The delegation did not interview any representatives of armed factions or drug traffickers.

A. Governance

1. Haitian views

   a. Interim regime’s weakness. The delegation interviewed a wide variety of Haitian officials and nongovernmental representatives. The composite view was that the interim regime was weak; it did not even control 60 percent of the national territory. A minority view (Lavalas, and with caveats, the human-rights organization CARLI, Lawyers’ Committee for Respect of Individual Rights) held it to be actively repressive. While overall public opinion was negative, many had grudgingly concluded that the regime needed to be retained with all its warts, and if possible improved, because the disruption caused by overturning it so near to elections would outweigh any possible gain.

   In short, because of the deficit in the interim government’s performance, many Haitians were tempted to call for a new government. Yet many others did not see the alternative in the time remaining.

   One veteran politician, Marc L. Bazin, summed up the dilemma by saying that the time for the transition was too short, but extending it would just extend the time for this government to continue making its mistakes.

   There was also an acknowledgment among some of a deeper truth, that it was futile to be hyper-critical of the interim regime because any government inheriting the devastation of the Aristide era would have faced the same problems.

   A council of eminent persons, Conseil des Sages, was put in place by the April 4, 2004 agreement of political parties to act as a quasi-parliament overseeing the interim government. In our interviews, members of the council expressed their determination to have elections that would solve the Haitian political crisis. If a member of the government tried to prevent that from happening, that person could be removed, they said.

   Several of our Haitian interlocutors stressed the baleful effect of the trauma resulting from the high hopes invested in Aristide and the deep disappointment and hurt today. There was a special psychological angle to this. Haitians prided themselves on their ability at least, even at
nadirs of their fortunes, not to be fooled. But they had been; they had been done in by a first-class con artist. Of that they were ashamed, although they were loath to admit it publicly.

What it meant was that they would be even more wary of government, politicians, and elections than they always had been. There was a crisis of confidence in the country. No one trusted anyone.

Outside of Port-au-Prince, the rest of the country felt forgotten, left out by the interim regime which had minimal presence there. The government had not reached out to the people, Haitians said in virtual unison. The interim regime needed to convince the sectors which had appointed it, in last year’s political agreement, to go out and work among the population on the election preparations. To date, the regime had not impacted on society, it had not won recognition.

Addressing this neglect of the rest of the country, the prime minister and other officials touted their proposal of administrative centers in the provincial cities, which would make government services available to a population that had never had them.

Equally, popular organizations working for the people in Cité Soleil and against the gangs there reported that the interim government had no presence there. One could commit a crime there with complete impunity. One could pull out one’s gun and do it again tomorrow.

b. Lack of security. Permeating people’s views of governance was the acutely-felt lack of security. Haitians in the capital sometimes felt that they could be shot on the street if they got too obviously involved in politics. Although it was less tense up-country, in Port-au-Prince the young people sensed the fear of armed groups, their apparent impunity, and the likelihood that politicians of various stripes were surreptitiously sponsoring them.

Equally, the Haitian population was bitter about the complete impunity that reigned for political crimes and corruption. “Why do we have to have thieves governing us?”

c. Corruption. It was difficult to say whether the population saw the interim government to be as corrupt as Aristide’s. The population generally felt that the country had been devastated by Aristide and that the corruption and impunity continued. A member of the Conseil des Sages believed that traditional Haitian corruption had reappeared.

On this question, President Boniface Alexandre and other government officials contended that the government fought it and no cabinet ministers were corrupt. Another top official acknowledged its pervasiveness at lower levels, but maintained that the government had proceeded with transparency on a recent scandal involving the resale of donated rice by a city official. The government had published every step it pursued on this issue. It did not attempt to cover up as was the custom in Haiti. The interim government sought to set a different tone, the official contended.
Corruption remained out of hand in the government echelons, however, top officials acknowledged. Low or no salaries contributed to civil servants’ corruption. They had no incentive to do their jobs honestly. With every businessman who came to the government for a permit, the clerks asked why should he get to make money with their help unless they got some? The attitude was jealous and self-defeating, but there it was. The government had increased salaries to address this corruption and warned of prosecution for corrupt practices.

The government had appointed a joint public-private commission to study the problem of the Port-au-Prince port, which was the most expensive in the Caribbean. But the government’s hands were somewhat tied in making major changes because it was unelected and operated under a time constraint.

Another official reported that medical equipment imported for the city hospital was reaching its destination safely from customs and with no problems. The health ministry’s warehouse, although expensive, was secure.

The government had launched an anti-corruption probe to try to recover some of the money filched by the previous regime. It had also sent ten new teams to the provincial towns to cut down on smuggling. The teams were given three months to perform. The government did not expect miracles, but it did expect more revenue than it was receiving now.

Informed Haitian observers believed that this job could be difficult because elements of the customs in the outports were allied with the criminals and ex-military. In Gonaïves, the delegation learned that the port remained in the hands of local gangs despite the presence there of a heavily-armed U.N. battalion since last September.

d. Women and good governance. It was pointed out that women in Haiti could play a bigger role than ever before in the establishment of good governance. The peasant women played a big role economically. Women were a force in the country, they had a better sense of responsibility than men in, for example, repaying debts. Women candidates in the next elections should be well received by voters of both sexes. The organization Fanm Yo La/Collectif Féminin Haïtien pour la participation politique des femmes was grooming woman candidates for the elections.

2. Foreign views

MINUSTAH felt the same fallout of the population’s disappointment with Aristide, the results of their feeling of having been rolled. An aspect of that history particularly affecting MINUSTAH was the failure of the previous U.N. mission of the 1990's. That failure lowered expectations for the current mission. Also adding to the confidence deficit was the fact that Haitian society had made an enormous effort to bring about the change of February 29, 2004, and was completely exhausted. Things had been expected to change after Aristide’s departure, yet a simple change of government had not changed ingrained attitudes.
MINUSTAH saw the interim government as one of technocrats which had not offered leadership to that exhausted people. The leaders of the government were decent and honest in themselves. Although not well unified, they did fight for the right things. Yet they were ineffectual, and therein lay a perplexing paradox.

In that vacuum it was not hard for extremists, whether pro-Aristide or ex-military, to make headway.

One could get rid of the interim government, MINUSTAH considered, but a successor government would have less legitimacy than this one, could lose the international community, and open up to drug dealers.

Foreign diplomats in Haiti noted that the influence of the ex-military and its presence was very deep inside the government. The government had made various promises to the ex-military, and was not interested in disbanding and disarming them. It considered them the good guys. Should the U.N. mission leave, the government wouldn’t be able to shake off the ex-military’s hold. Apart from former army commander Gen. Herard Abraham, both Youri Latortue, the prime minister’s cousin and personal security chief, and David Basile, the secretary-of-state for public security, were ex-FADH.

MINUSTAH expressed the same dilemma that Marc Bazin noted above: the transition was too short, yet there was now no alternative to holding elections as scheduled this year.

The issue then, MINUSTAH believed, was how to help this vulnerable transition government limp along just that far, understanding that the real transition would come after the elections. The issue was how to get through elections without mortgaging the future government too heavily. If the ex-FADH problem, for example, remained unresolved, it would mortgage the future government which as noted above could not resist this armed body once the U.N. left. The issue for the U.N. then was how to salvage its mission.

An advantage in doing that was that the core group—the U.N., United States, Canada, and France—were together on all issues, especially support of the interim regime. It was only some sectors of public opinion in some countries that made difficulties.

3. Our conclusions: A dangerous debate risks undermining the interim regime’s legitimacy

The glaring weaknesses of the interim regime stem first from the uneven competence of its own personnel, but more basically from the circumstances of its creation. It was essentially a shell created, with some but insufficient Haitian ownership, by the U.S. and French intervention during March-June 2004. A technocratic administration, it almost by definition had no roots in the Haitian body politic. And it inherited a veritable Augean stable, a truly impossible situation the dimensions of which our assessment mission of April 2004 found to be overwhelming.

The leading reporter Nancy Roc and the late political leader Gérard Pierre-Charles have each contended in their own way that this administration put in by the foreigners blocked the
natural emergence of a more authentically Haitian body arising from the popular movement that overthrew Aristide. However, how such a more effectively Haitian regime could have been put in place without the foreigners, given the presence of the armed ex-FADH and political gangs on the scene, was not explained by either writer. Nor is it clear how such a putatively more authentic government could have been any more effective against the awful weight of problems left over from the Aristide regime.

During its stay in Haiti, the mission interviewed the three runner-up candidates for prime minister in the Conseil des Sages’ winnowing-out process in April 2004. In each case, the combination of merits and demerits suggested no decisive advantage over the choice that was eventually made.

In any event, any account of the weaknesses of governance of the interim regime must acknowledge, and indeed make the most of, the significant bright spots in its performance. One of these is the ministry of finance, which has balanced the books and published the budget on time. There are many other flashes of competence in the regime which counsel against a blanket conclusion.

Building on these vantage points, the Haiti Democracy Project delegation believes that the interim regime and U.N. mission need to tamp down, to the extent possible, the inevitable friction between them to avoid undermining what is left of the regime’s legitimacy. Simply put, each needs the other too much. The Haitian government cannot survive without the U.N.’s protection. The U.N. cannot fulfill its mandate without a functioning Haitian government. The previous months, December through February, saw an uptick in police-U.N. successful joint operations. The very welcome improvement in security that these operations achieved has now been temporarily disrupted by the recent jailbreak and latest incidents involving a pro-Aristide demonstration and former prime minister Yvon Neptune’s fate. The larger trend can and ought to be to use the U.N.’s forces, now fully deployed and technically capable, to shore up the shaky Haitian police. If the police are not so assisted they will crumble, and no one is more aware of this than the U.N. mission.

The U.N. has the physical force on the ground to contain Haitian violence, and the ingredients for valid elections are there if they can just be combined. In this, Western public opinion can play no small role. If it sides with the cause of good governance in Haiti, it could help create the right atmosphere for successful elections in Haiti.

4. Transition in 2006

In one year, the entire government of Haiti will be replaced: every major decision-maker will be replaced from the president and prime minister to cabinet ministers, the heads of all agencies and state-run enterprises to the governor the central bank and police chief and mayors. In addition there will be ninety-nine new deputies and thirty new senators. The new ones will probably be inexperienced and overwhelmed by the magnitude of tasks they will inherit. With all the demands of security and elections, no one has focused on this continued transitional challenge.
It is critical that the international community engage with capable nongovernmental institutions such as the university, business associations, human-rights and grassroots organizations who can provide some continuity. While many of the new decisions-makers will come from these sectors and the political parties, it is critical to strengthen some of these institutions for the continued transition. Among the many qualified Haitian organizations, the proposals of the Centre pour la Libre Enterprise et la Démocratie (CLED) for strengthening of the parliament and to enlisting current government officials to consult in preparing position papers and briefings for their successors are an example of those deserving support.

B. Security

Security is and has been for more than a century the primary problem in establishing successful governance in Haiti. The intimidation practiced by small armed minorities has repeatedly overcome the strong sense for public order of the mass of the population and has negated the innumerable acts of kindness they practice toward each other every day at the popular level.

1. Haitian views on the police

   a. Viewpoint of the Haitian police. The police asked for more arms, training, and numbers. Forty-two police had been killed, according to police authorities, in the line of duty during the past year. (Thirty-four is the number cited by foreign media.) Any more, and the police would begin to disintegrate. The police were facing an alliance between the former FADH and chimères financed by the drug dealers. Although the police had fired five hundred corrupt members, which was almost one-third of the force left from the previous regime, this unholy alliance was still striving to take over and control the police.

      The police needed more sophisticated arms and body armor. During the delegation’s visit, the final touches were being put on a purchase list which the United States would authorize. The police also wanted a helicopter and plane and a U.S. coast-guard cutter patrolling the southern coast to cut off the Colombian fast boats bringing drugs and weapons.

      From the police’s point of view, the U.N. mission needed to be more aggressive. The police and MINUSTAH needed to go into Cité Soleil and reduce the pockets of resistance, e.g., the gangs. The names and locations of the gangleaders were known. MINUSTAH talked to them, and so the gangleaders would say, “We are being nice to you, so don’t shoot at me.” This would continue if MINUSTAH didn’t show a strong presence. The time for talk was past, these people needed to be rounded up. MINUSTAH needed to help guard, as well as patrol: it said it wouldn’t stay in the same place for twenty-four hours, but would just do mobile patrolling. MINUSTAH only worked for eight hours a day. But one needed to work with the police twenty-four hours a day to professionalize them and reduce corruption. The police believed that Haiti and the international community needed to push U.N. force commander Lt. Gen. Augusto Heleno Ribeiro to engage the gangs. Meanwhile, the general was saying that the police were too aggressive.
The police cited “Operation Baghdad” and warned that the ex-FADH renegade Remissainthe Ravix had also declared war on the HNP. The police had begun to arrest some ex-FADH, but they did not have political backup from the government.

Summing up, the police listed twelve things they needed between now and the elections:

1. MINUSTAH cooperation to go after the political gangs and ex-FADH now.
2. Weapons and ammunition
3. Personal protective vests
4. Permanent CIVPOL presence in every police station
5. Intelligence reinforcement
6. Vetting process against corruption in active-duty police
7. Renovation and outfitting of police stations across the country
8. Life insurance for police officers
9. Goal of eight thousand members
10. More support for the government in logistics
11. Joint drug operations
12. Coast-guard cutter along the southern coast

b. Viewpoint of the secretary of state for public security (number-two position, with responsibility for the police, within the ministry of justice).

For police intelligence to begin to function effectively, the national identity card that was to be issued during voter registration could be a help. Lack of ID cards favored criminality. During the past year, Haiti had tried to reassemble the SIN (national intelligence service) within the ministry of the interior. It was to work on narcotics. Besides that, there was no central intelligence agency to receive all-source intelligence and set strategy. There was an anti-corruption taskforce, but it was unfunded.

Funding of that task force and the office of the secretary of state for public security was crucial. The secretary maintained that there had been no budget for his office, although it was now being added. The ministry of justice received the smallest budget of any major governmental function.

c. Views of political parties and mass organizations. The Group of 184 called for disarming of the ex-military and Lavalas gangs. There were too many armed “no-go” zones. There ought to be less friction between the police and MINUSTAH. The group and other Haitian organizations believed that the police were only armed with pistols while facing opponents with M-14s. Other Haitians noted that the police had inherited a bad reputation from the Aristide era and many of them continued their corruption.

CEP officials, referring to their headquarters fronting on the busy Delmas Road, considered the police guarding their building almost as scarecrows. They didn’t even have bullets in their guns.
2. Foreign views of security situation

MINUSTAH had concluded that its opponents had intelligence within the Haitian National Police. The U.N. could not share with the police the targets of proposed joint operations because they were immediately tipped off from inside the police. This was the case both in Port-au-Prince and Gonaïves, where the Haiti Democracy Project fact-finding mission visited on February 20.

The dilemma remained that MINUSTAH would only go into houses with the police, in pursuit of its mandate to “support,” not replace, Haitian governing structures.

Past corruption and cruelty by the police under Aristide, and continuing under the interim government, had turned public opinion strongly against them in places like Cité Soleil. MINUSTAH acknowledged that the police had done some ugly things and urgently needed to reestablish their image. The Brazilian force commander General Heleno had remarked that he was unafraid to walk alone in Cité Soleil, but he was afraid to do it in the company of the Haitian National Police.

The CIVPOL representative in Gonaïves noted that the Haitian National Police were present in only a few locations. They didn’t have cars and were demobilized. There were theoretically twenty-two police stations in the Artibonite. Maybe seven were working. There were twenty gang units at large in the Artibonite.

On the broader question of MINUSTAH strategy, the MINUSTAH mission emphasized that it faced a political, not merely military problem in the ex-FADH and political gangs because each of them had mobilized some support among the population. This meant both could put up a screen of unarmed women and children in front who could and did throw stones at the MINUSTAH soldiers. Various examples were cited. The MINUSTAH could not just shoot into the crowd.

The U.N. mission head also cited the example of the ex-FADH in Cap-Haïtien. When the Chilean MINUSTAH soldiers first arrived, these ex-FADH greeted them with a gift of barbecued chicken. They got up each morning at 5 a.m. and saluted the Haitian flag. They were involved in no criminal activities other than the fact that they were bearing arms. Although the Chilean troops in Cap-Haïtien had the physical ability to wipe out the ex-FADH base in two hours any time they wanted to, the problem was not a technical military one. In mid-March MINUSTAH was able to get two hundred of them to publicly disarm, although only seven old arms were turned in.

3. Our conclusions

Electoral progress in Haiti faces a “triple threat” of chimères, ex-FADH, and drug traffickers. The collusion among them creates a challenge to which U.S. policy must respond. They are working together to kill policemen and stop elections. Both chimères and ex-FADH believe they can then swallow each other, once they have managed to undermine the Latortue government and U.N. mission.

a. Technically at 1,500, CIVPOL is not numerous enough nor deployed well enough.
b. The DEA needs more staff and more technical ability to intercept. The United States should dispatch a DEA in-country unit to work with the HNP to shut down the drug trafficking by sea on the southern coast and by land in well-identified airstrips. This mission would serve the dual purposes of shutting down the trafficking to the United States and stopping the supply of weapons and money from the traffickers to the criminal elements within Haiti.

c. The jailbreak of February 19 was carried out from the inside, by bribery and infiltration, and it is prime evidence of the corruption and limited competence of the police.

d. There will be a vital need for enhanced security from May to the beginning of voter registration.

e. The MINUSTAH posture is dangerously passive and risks letting political gangs, ex-FADH, and drug traffickers combine in a way that gravely imperils the elections. The Haiti Democracy Project delegation considered that MINUSTAH needed to play “aggressive soccer.” At the moment, it is so afraid of making mistakes that it is afraid to put the ball in the air. Without doing that one cannot score goals.

The initiatives that MINUSTAH has taken in recent months in concert with the HNP, from blocking the ex-FADH from openly carrying weapons (November) and moving into Cité Soleil (December) and Belair (ongoing), resulted in a major improvement in the security situation only temporarily overshadowed by the jailbreak and other issues. These show the enormous capabilities and potential of these combined operations to contain Haitian violence. Making such initiatives the larger trend is the challenge of the moment. A passive posture risks making a technically proficient and potent force ineffective towards the main goals of the mission. Also, friction with the police, who have clearly put their lives on the line, must be carefully managed and reduced to avoid a further weakening of the police and serious damage to the larger mission.

None of this is intended to belittle the enormous effort that the United Nations and contributing nations, Latin American and other, are making to solution of the long-running Haitian dilemma. Many of these nations took a considerable political risk by sending their elite troops into the volatile political situation that is Haiti. In particular, the great initiative of the leading Latin American countries to step up to a challenge within their hemisphere cannot be gainsaid. After seeing the troops in the field the Haiti Democracy Project considers that the governments and publics of these countries should be proud of their contribution and sacrifice, and our remarks are aimed at making this input a decisive instrument of success.

C. Elections

Haiti’s political atmosphere contains both polarizing and synthesizing tendencies in a confusing mix. The electoral commission plods forward with a schedule in October and November. The OAS is proceeding with registration and ID cards. Political parties talk of coalitions and pacts, but also fear bad security situations. Even the majority of the Lavalas party wants to participate, although they face death threats from the exiled ex-president.
The fact that even Iraq with its level of violence could hold elections was a wake-up call to many in Haiti. Latin American diplomats in Haiti were already familiar with elections amidst violence in their countries. Even amidst the Haitian political actors’ habitual pessimism, the delegation encountered some grudging acknowledgment that if elections could be held in Iraq, they should be possible in Haiti.

1. Near-consensus to hold elections this year

   a. Security fears. An argument against fall elections exists. From the political parties and human-rights organizations, a strong concern is expressed summed up in one politician’s prediction, “The elections will be a massacre.” On current evidence there appears a risk of low turnout, of intimidation, of the population staying strictly away from elections and politics beyond whatever security perimeter the police and U.N. mission manage to establish. This could confine electioneering to the extremes and drug-financed candidates, or to another last-minute charismatic “messiah.”

   The delegation was particularly struck by the lack of psychological anticipation for elections and no sense of the potential of valid elections to finally resolve Haiti’s nineteen-year political crisis. Haiti showed little sign of being only eight months away from a momentous opportunity to fill the vacuum of governance that had devastated the country for so many years.

   b. Greater fears of postponement. More compelling than the arguments for postponement is the declining legitimacy of the government, as nothing would be gained by postponement.

   Also arguing for proceeding with elections under the current regime was the fact that its members are excluded from office in a future government and so have no stake in the outcome. Except perhaps for the administration of President Ertha Trouillot in 1990, this was the first time the government had no dog in the race. Politicians in Haiti were traditionally looking to the government to help rig the election for them. The U.N. mission considered that it was a major advantage to have a government with no stake in the elections.

   The prime minister and ministers of the Latortue government interviewed insisted on their strong determination to hold valid elections on schedule and leave on February 7, 2006. The government repeatedly expressed its commitment to an election open to all, including the Lavalas party. Ministers said they wanted to see an election that would be the best Haiti ever had, and above serious criticism.

   It was difficult to generalize about the receptivity of the Haitian masses to elections. On the one hand most professed disgust with politics and were completely disappointed following their taking Aristide as a messiah (see above). On the other hand, Haiti was poor, politics was an end game, the news was always about politics. Even those who said they weren’t interested were obligated to pay attention. They knew that if one didn’t choose for oneself, someone else would make that choice on one’s behalf and might not choose wisely. Once the process was fairly underway there would be a strong impetus to join. A measure of that was the very multiplicity of
parties; a negative in itself, but a sign of interest. The breadth of the other social organizations also showed that Haitians wanted to be engaged.

2. Newness of electoral process

a. Electoral law. The electoral law had been only been decreed in January. The U.N. election experts gave the CEP credit for having compiled the electoral law in a transparent manner.

The OAS was gearing up thoughtfully for voter registration. Two capable experts, Santiago Mori of Argentina and Elizabeth Spehar of Canada were arriving to oversee fifteen teams of registrars, including three mobile teams. Some $8.7 million had been received for this from the U.S. government. Some 4.5 million voters need to be registered.

b. Reduction of polling sites. The U.N., OAS and CEP plan to drastically reduce polling sites to a manageable number for security. The plan is to enhance security by centralizing twelve thousand polling places into six hundred “voting centers” which can be guarded by MINUSTAH.

Previously, each BIV (individual polling place) was divided into three BV’s (voting bureaus). There had been four thousand BIV’s and twelve thousand BV’s. In the next election, they would not have the BIV’s anymore.

This time, voters would vote where they registered. They would have six hundred registration centers (Centres d’Inscription) which would have six hundred voting centers, which together would contain the twelve thousand ballot boxes. There would be an average of twenty ballot boxes per voting center. This would make it easier to protect.

The big ones would have one thousand ballot boxes. There would be a Centre d’Inscription in every commune of five thousand or more. With these centers, they could reach 90 percent of the population. Questions remain on voter accessibility to the drastically reduced number of sites.

One would not receive the ID cards when one registered. The registrars would not have the capacity to take fingerprints and issue cards on the spot.

Rather, the U.N. electoral experts wanted to issue the ID cards on election day as an incentive to vote. The cards should be free. They conferred a citizen’s identity and would be needed for everything from cashing a check to applying for foreign visas.

c. CEP teething problems. The internal-management problems of the CEP began last summer and continue apace. Nevertheless, it got high marks from U.N. election experts for transparency. The U.N. considered that this CEP, unlike the last one, was not planning to organize any fraud. Its preparation of the electoral law was distinguished for its openness, and each current member is considered to be honest, if somewhat uneven in competence.
The current CEP faced potential serious security problems and it has been afflicted by various organizational weaknesses ever since its founding.

Last summer the commission was thrown into disarray by internal discord related to a domineering president who rode roughshod over the other members, or so they felt. Last December that member was replaced.

More recently, some of its members sought to respond to the undoubted serious security threat they face by trying to sneak by an extra $100,000 apiece in “danger pay.” This scandalized Haiti’s political society, many of whom believe they confront the same dangers. The attempt appeared to be outrageous under the circumstances, and only a couple of members tried to slip it through. It meant another unfortunate rift on an important body.

However, the security problem was real and had a history. The chimères had invaded a major meeting of the previous CEP with civil society in 2000, scattering threats and bottles of urine. The former CEP head, Léon Manus, had been spirited out of the country by the U.S. embassy to save his life from political mobs, after he had refused to sign falsified results.

Thus, the current members and teams of the CEP were taking a major personal risk by serving. The headquarters on Delmas Road, as noted, was as open as a public market. There were not even security cameras.

The CEP underlined that lack of communications equipment cut it off from the nine teams it had sent to the countryside. The few cell phones that had been provided didn’t work beyond Carrefour or St. Marc. If something happened to the teams, the CEP would learn about it on the radio.

The delegation also heard a recitation of confusing turf problems between the CEP and OAS. Although as noted above the OAS was bypassing the CEP and handling voter registration directly, members of the CEP said that it should manage the registration. The issue was handled by making the CEP the chair of a committee that also included the U.N., OAS, U.S. and Canadian embassies, and the European Union—the roll call of donors funding the process.

The CEP nevertheless objected to the OAS making decisions on Haitian elections outside of the CEP. The CEP was transparent, but it felt it never knew what the OAS was doing. It felt that it was almost executing a plan made outside of the commission.

Also from the CEP were complaints that the international funders were keeping it on too tight a leash. It lacked both authority and money. While $43 million had been committed to the elections, outside organizations like the OAS spent it without the CEP’s approval. Such money and turf problems promise to hang on and provide the grist for strain and scandals throughout the electoral preparations.

Only one or two members of the nine-member commission appeared to have impressive administrative and organizational abilities. The schedule that one member, François Benoit, had
established at the beginning was allowed to slip to due to the pressure of events and internal inefficiency.

To begin with, the CEP had fired sixty of the eighty-two staff because they were incompetent loyalists put in by Aristide. It had not replaced them.

Moreover, rather than work as a team, it appeared that each member of the commission carved out a particular area to micro-manage. Nine people were competing to do all the jobs. They spent at least one month on their bylaws. On paper, it had a manager (director-general). Like any organization, it needed a strong director-general, who would implement the overall policy decisions made by the board. But the CEP, after its initial problems with the domineering president the previous summer, had voted not to have a strong president. It was unlikely to get a strong director-general.

The Haiti Democracy Project delegation found it could not express an opinion at the micro-level of the turf problems brought to its attention by the commission. A member of the project proposed to help with a CEP delegation to Washington, where the funding agencies were, to raise the funding questions.

d. Lavalas participation. There are some hopeful signs of a positive response by the former majority party to the opportunity of elections. A majority of the Lavalas party wants to participate. The moderate members of Lavalas were meeting to form an electoral strategy, to be carried out either through Lavalas or beyond. They were opposed by Aristide from South Africa. Some members of this moderate majority complained of submission to “an African king,” who issued orders to kill by cell phone.

Lavalas was part of the tripartite commission that named the Conseil des Sages a year ago, which in term named the prime minister. Lavalas had declined to join the electoral council, citing arrests of some prominent Lavalas members.

Among the international players interviewed by the delegation, only one emphasized that much more needed to be done to win over the Lavalas moderates to the process. They needed to be given incentives. These incentives would include jobs and government services delivered to the population.

This source also considered that one needed to create a credible alternative to Lavalas, otherwise it could sweep the elections. Lavalas had a large base on the ground. A lot of people on the ground still believed that Lavalas spoke for them. If the process broke down resulting in the return of Aristide, it would be a full-scale disaster for Haiti.

A former high Aristide official interviewed by the delegation considered that in a fair election, Lavalas would get two-thirds of the seats in parliament. Informed members of the delegation consider that to be wishful thinking; 20 percent might be more realistic.
e. Political-party pact. Several of the smaller social-democratic parties spoke of political pacts and coalitions to supersede the winner-take-all ethos of previous Haitian elections. There would be a pact that the winner and runner-up parties would share governance. The result would be a coalition after the election of the winner and the three runner-up parties. This win-win proposition would reduce instability within the legislature.

Also some parties have begun to merge or ally, such as Congrès National des Mouvements Démocratiques (KONAKOM) and Parti National Progressiste et Révolutionnaire (PANPRA). Evans Paul’s Konfederasyon Inite Demokratik (KID) was also looking to merge with another party. Such moves promised greater coherence of parties.

Many of the Haitians believe that there should be a national dialogue, a concept which originally meant a national conference to decide all the problems and name a government, but now with the existence of an interim regime and electoral process is more a national-reconciliation session.

3. Security up-country doubtful

With 60 percent of the national territory beyond the control of the government, and little sign of an aggressive HNP-MINUSTAH plan to retake this territory, elections in the rural areas remain a challenge. There is no plan yet to deal with the threat of the ex-FADH dominating certain rural areas. The Haiti Democracy Project recommends that MINUSTAH organize an air-mobile, quick-reaction force that can contend with gang and ex-FADH domination of certain rural areas. Otherwise domination of local electoral process by ex-FADH and section chiefs will pose a major problem for validity of results from those areas.

There is no plan yet to deal with drug money controlling candidates and election. The drug cartels were working to get the next government in their pocket. They would have their candidates. They would have keen interest also in local elections so that they could gain control of transhipment spots like Aquin.

The delegation heard and commends proposals from Haitians for foreign assistance in financing political parties to counter what is certain to be a challenge from drug-financed parties and candidates.

4. Diaspora voting

Members of the delegation noted that the diaspora wanted to be included, to vote and run and strongly urged the CEP to find the ways and means. The diaspora contributed enormously to Haiti’s economy, it should have a voice in its politics.

The CEP’s response was in principle to accept diaspora voting, but to take refuge in technical questions. The CEP agreed on diaspora participation. Due to financial, technical, and political constraints, it would not be able to address it this time. It had to create the ID card, with which next time there would be the base to tackle the diaspora issue.
V. Conclusion

Repeatedly over the past nineteen years, the Haitian people have recognized elections as their opportunity to personally contribute to long-overdue political modernization. They have come out en masse to elections that were contested and reasonably free, and have spurned those that they perceived as rigged. Creating security for next fall’s elections, and encouraging the psychological atmosphere in which the population sees the elections as valid and decisive, is this year’s primordial task.

The actors working against free elections, while not numerous, are armed. Should the armed factions prevail against the interim regime’s and foreigners’ attempt to hold elections, Haiti will descend further toward the chaos of a Rwanda, Somalia, or eastern Congo, where armed militias roam freely, destroying the economy and massacring the people.

Elections are the means by which Haiti can achieve stable, accepted, and accountable government. While such a government would benefit all classes, it would most of all benefit the poor, victimized majority. Without such a government, the current violence and economic stagnation will deepen and condemn the vast majority to even greater misery.

VI. Appendix

A. Schedule of visits in Haiti, February 17–23, 2005

Gérard Latortue, prime minister
Henri Bazin, minister of finance
Dr. Mickaël Leandre, director-general, ministry of health
President Boniface Alexandre
David Basile, secretary of state for public security
Gen. Hé rard Abraham, minister of foreign affairs
Michèle Pierre-Louis, Fon dation Connaissance et Liberté (FOKAL)
Lorraine Mangonès, program coordinator, FOKAL
U.S. ambassador James Foley
Douglas Griffiths, U.S. deputy chief of mission
Pierre Esperance, National Coalition for Haitian Rights
Renan Hédouville, Lawyers' Committee for Respect of Individual Rights
Lt. Col. Carlos Pé rez Aquino, battalion commander of U.N. forces at Gonaives
Smarck Michel, former prime minister

Jean-Claude Bajeux, director of Ecumenical Center for Human Rights
Jean Casimir, former Haitian ambassador to Washington
Canadian ambassador Claude Boucher
Amb. Denneth Modeste, head of OAS mission
Provisional Electoral Council
Conseil des Sages
Gérardo Le Chevallier, U.N. elections director
Lé on Charles, chief of police
Sté phan Gruenberg, deputy chief of mission, embassy of France
Juan Gabriel Valdez, special representative of the U.N. secretary-general for Haiti
General Lugani, deputy commander of U.N. forces
Ambassadors of Brazil, Argentina, and the Dominican Republic to Haiti

Group of 184

Berthony Bellegarde, Secteur populaire urbaine et rurale 184
Exama Pierrot, Secteur Jeune/Universitaire
Jessie Ewald Benoit, Femmes et Droit Humains
Fleurant Ancelot, Syndicat
Napoléon Carlo, Syndicat/C.S.H.

Anthony Barbier, Secrétaire Executif G-184
André Apaid, Coordonnateur Général G-184
Yanick Lahens, Responsable de Contrat Social
Jude Charles Faustin, Responsable de Comité d'Extension 184
Political parties (incomplete list)

Dr. Luc Mésadieu, president, Movement Chrétien pour une Nouvelle Haïti (Mochrenha)
Dr. Guy D. Théodore, ADEBHA
Marc L. Bazin, president, Mouvement pour l'Instauration de la Démocratie en Haïti (MIDH)
Marie Denise Claude, Parti Démocrate Chrétien Haïtien
Dr. Jan Hénold Buteau
Frantz Robert Mondé, former president of chamber of deputies
Louis Erick, Parti Democratique Haïtien (PADEMH)
Claire Lydie Parent (PADEMH)
Timothée Jean-Wilberson, CNHS
Turneb Delpé, ex-senator, secretary general of P.N.D.P.H.
Morisseau Lazare, Grand Front Centre-Droit (GFCD)

Dr. Daniel Supplice, Parti Populaire du Renouveau Haitien (PPRH), a.k.a. Génération 2004
Jean-Hénéld Buteau, Mouvement pour la Reconstruction Nationale (MRN)
Gérard Blot, Tet Ansanm
O’Donnell Maximin, MODEREH (Democratic Haitian Reform Movement)
Sen. Prince Pierre Sonson, MODEREH
Karine Roy Talon, secretary-general, Grand Rassemblement pour l’évolution d’Haiti (GREH)
Col. Himmler Rébu, president, GREH
Evans Paul, Konfederasyon Inite Demokratik (KID)
Prof. Leslie Manigat, Rassemblement des Démocrates Nationalistes et Progressistes

Popular organizations

Claude Perpignand, Henri Riquet Perpignand Fondation
Vernon Jean, MOREGA (Grande Anse)
Tony Saint-II, CPDEP/Ruelle Civique
Jean-Claude Felix, Ass. Cap Soleil Lever
Jean Ronald Régistre, Fondation Collectif des Notables de Cité Soleil (CONOCS)
Rev. Jean Enock Joseph, coordinator-general, CONOCS
Martin Guiton Dorimain, Observation Ca.
Yves Daniel, M.O.S.E.H.
Jean-Gabriel Fortuné, Ligue Citoyenne pour le Progrès

Tony Lubérisse, Président du Mouvement des Jeunes de Liancourt (Bas-Artibonite) pour la Culture et la Développement
Michel Amazan, vice-president, Organisation des Paysans pour le Développement des plus Démunis de Gressier
Marie Héroline Michel, treasurer, Fanm Yo La/Collectif Féminin Haitien pour la participation politique des femmes
Mirlande Ylophene, Fanm Yo La

B. Schedule of visits in Washington, March 14–16, 2005

Department of Defense. John Merrill, principal program officer for Latin America, Office of Secretary of Defense

State Department
Assistant Secretary of State Roger F. Noriega
Principal deputy assistant secretary James Derham
Brian Nichols, director of Office of Caribbean Affairs

Earl Irving, office of U.S. mission to OAS
Howard Davis, chief of Caribbean section, Intelligence and Research

Inter-American Development Bank
Ericq Pierre, senior counsellor to executive board
Charles Bassett, executive director for Canada
Rogério Studart, executive director for Brazil and Surinam
Michel Planque, executive director for France

Hector Morales, executive director for the United States
Allen Rodriguez, senior counselor for the United States
Pedro Auger, senior counselor for Chile
Nestor Forster, embassy of Brazil

Agency for International Development
Michele Schimpp, team leader for elections

Gerald Barth, senior adviser for Haiti

International Republican Institute
Georges Fauriol, vice-president
Partial listing of organizations in attendance

Associated Press
Center for American Progress
Congressional Research Service
Embassy of Haiti
Embassy of Peru
Inter-American Dialogue
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
International Foundation for Election Systems
International Crisis Group
Manchester Trade
National Organization for Advancement of Haitians
National Center for State Courts
Rassemblement des Démocrates Nationalistes et Progressistes
World Vision

Organization of American States
Amb. Luigi Einaudi, acting secretary-general

C. Selection of works consulted by the mission


Ibid., “Haiti's Transition: Hanging in the Balance” (Latin America/Caribbean Briefing No. 7, February 8, 2005).


Jean-Michel Caroit, “Haiti attend, depuis près d'un an, l'aide internationale promise” (Le Monde, February 9, 2005).


Centre pour la Libre Enterprise et la Démocratie, “Réflexion du CLED sur la transition,” December 7, 2004


Thomas M. Griffin, “Haiti Human Rights Investigation, November 11–21, 2004” (Center for the Study of Human Rights, University of Miami School of Law).


Dumas M. Siméus, “Open Letter to the Congressional Black Caucus,” October 29, 2004


D. Abbreviations used in the text

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>AID.</td>
<td>U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>BIV.</td>
<td>Registration office</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARLI.</td>
<td>Comité des Avocats pour le Respect des Libertés Individuelles</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEP.</td>
<td>Provisional Electoral Council</td>
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<td>CIVPOL.</td>
<td>U.N. Civilian Police</td>
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<td>CLED.</td>
<td>Centre pour la Libre Enterprise et la Démocratie</td>
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<td>U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency</td>
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<td>DoD.</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Defense</td>
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<td>Armed Forces of Haiti</td>
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<td>FOKAL.</td>
<td>Fondation Connaissance et Liberté</td>
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<td>H.E.R.O.</td>
<td>Haitian Economic Recovery Opportunity Act</td>
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<td>Haitian National Police</td>
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<td>Interim government of Haiti</td>
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<td>KID.</td>
<td>Konfederasyon Inite Demokratik</td>
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<td>KONAKOM.</td>
<td>Congrès National des Mouvements Démocratiques</td>
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<td>MINUSTAH.</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
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<td>NCHR.</td>
<td>National Coalition for Haitian Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAS.</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
</tr>
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<td>PANPRA.</td>
<td>Parti National Progressiste et Révolutionnaire</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIN.</td>
<td>National Intelligence Service</td>
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E. Photographs of delegation

(On following page.)