Originally: On Occasion of Meeting of OAS Permanent Council

1. Clearly, the time has come for the OAS?s Permanent Council, in its scheduled meeting on Thursday, April 3, to invoke Article 20 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter and convene a special session of the General Assembly to consider the suspension of Haiti from the exercise of its right to participate in the OAS (under the Charter?s Article 21).
By invoking Article 20, the Permanent Council would explicitly acknowledge that an unconstitutional alteration of Haiti?s constitutional regime has seriously impaired democratic order in that country, and that its diplomatic initiatives have thus far proved unsuccessful in fostering the restoration of democracy. After more than two years of fruitless effort and in response to the regime?s continued recalcitrance, such an acknowledgment is not only appropriate, but both necessary and timely. Its effect will be to increase the urgency of diplomatic efforts to resolve the Haitian crisis and to focus those efforts squarely on changing the behavior of the principal actors responsible for the continuing interruption of democratic order in that country, the Haitian state and government apparatus. To do otherwise is to undermine the spirit of the recently adopted Charter itself, and to invite either more vigorous bilateral initiatives or eventual U.N. involvement in a situation that properly falls within the purview of the hemispheric organization.
2. Simultaneously, the Permanent Council should resolve to advocate the formation and support the efforts of a transitional administration in Haiti, charged with addressing the country?s immediate humanitarian, economic and security crises and leading the nation to free-and-fair elections within a more reasonable time frame than that currently ensconced in Resolution 822; perhaps as much as two years may be required. Such an administration would be technocratic in nature, apolitical in composition and?in keeping with the Haitian Constitution?functionally autonomous of the presidency.
Modeled on the OAS-brokered formula that provided the consensual basis for constituting a new Provisional Electoral Council?to which all parties agreed more than a year ago?any new formula for creating such a transitional government would properly be anchored by a preponderance of civil society participation, input and oversight, though it might well include limited political party participation in one or more of these roles as well. (Under similar circumstances in 1990, an internationally-backed government and CEP based on an essentially extra-constitutional political compromise succeeded in leading the country to its first?and arguably most credible?post-Duvalierist national elections, those that brought Aristide to his first presidency on February 7, 1991.)
Such a transitional administration, overseen by a civil society-based council of some sort and supported technically by foreign donors, would immediately open the door to the normalization of Haiti?s relationship with the international financial institutions, based on an IMF staff-monitored lending agreement and pursuant to a clearance of Haiti?s current arrears to the World Bank and the IDB. This resumption of multilateral assistance, in turn, is the sine qua non for tackling the humanitarian emergency now threatening the country, and for underwriting the substantial costs of the extensive disarmament program that will be required if public security and confidence are ever to be restored definitively. The mere creation and presence of a credible and internationally sanctioned transitional administration would itself have sufficient impact in this connection to jump-start the long-delayed electoral process.
Moreover, the Permanent Council?s charting of such a course at this juncture would have the additional virtue of recognizing that the international community?s most reliable and enduring ally in the current effort to restore democratic functionality to Haiti is Haitian civil society itself, which in recent months has demonstrated itself to be both willing and able to transcend the internecine political wrangling that has paralyzed the political class, and ready to act in the higher interests of the nation. Not only the recently formed civic coalition known as the Group of 184, but other organized elements of Haitian civil society from across the ideological spectrum, together with the established churches, should be immediately called upon by the OAS to join together in order to become full partners in the continuing and increasingly urgent search for a lasting solution to this persistent crisis?a crisis whose origins are clearly political, but whose resolution must, finally, be civil.
2. Rationale and background
GOH maneuvering since the visit of the OAS?s high-level delegation earlier this month has been universally decried as a series of empty gestures, at best. At worst, some of the regime?s putative ?responses? to the delegation?s long-overdue insistence on compliance with the terms and spirit of Resolution 822 by March 30th?most notably the appointment of a number of the president?s unqualified personal cronies to high-echelon command positions within the Haitian National Police?seem expressly aimed at making a mockery of the growing outcry against impunity from within Haiti, and of the international community?s own mediation efforts to date. Meanwhile, the continuing repression of peaceful dissent, the persistence of threats against civic and opposition leaders, the ongoing suppression of a free press and a series of well-documented attempts to unduly influence the judicial process give the lie to the regime?s disingenuous protestations to the contrary.